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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-FLoRIDA No-FAULT STATUTE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT BARRED TORT ACTION BY UN-
INSURED MOTORISTS FOR CLAIMS OF LESS THAN $550.00. Kluger
v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Clara Kiuger was involved in an auto collision, and had neither
standard nor limited collision insurance. She was not at fault and at-
tempted to sue defendant for property damage to her auto valued at
$250.00.' However, under Florida's no-fault insurance statute she
was barred from tort action because her property damage was below
the statutory threshold of $550.00.2 Thus by her own election under
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972), she became her own insurer
with no right to sue in tort unless her property damage exceeded
$550.00. The Supreme Court of Florida has reversed the circuit
court and has declared FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972) un-
constitutional. The court held that because the right to sue in tort
existed prior to the constitution, the legislature could not abolish a
tort action unless it provided a reasonable alternative, or could demon-
strate an overriding public necessity.
Kluger v. White creates yet another constitutional hurdle for
other state no-fault programs. This decision presents a strict con-
struction repugnant to the liberal landmark ruling in Massachusetts,
and it could create new drafting problems for states such as Oklahoma
which have not yet adopted any form of no-fault legislation.
The majority opinion in Kluger concluded that FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.738 (1972) failed to comply with Florida's constitutional pro-
vision that the courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
1. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972), abolishes the right to sue in tort, and
requires one to look to his own insurer for property damage recovery, unless he has
chosen not to purchase property damage insurance and has suffered property damage
in excess of $550.00.
3. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
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injury. Because of the statute plaintiff fell into a class of accident
victims with no recourse against any person or insurer for loss caused
by the fault of another. In dicta the court stated that mandatory prop-
erty damage insurance would be a constitutionally adequate alterna-
tive. However, this precipitates the question of whether the require-
ment of insurance for all motorists is reasonable.
In a vigorous dissent, three justices quoted the language and rea-
soning of Pinnick v. Cleary, and found Florida precedent for a broad
alteration of the tort system. In prior cases the Florida Supreme
Court had approved a guest statute, abolition of alienation of affec-
tion and seduction causes of action, and the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. They also found that the requisite public necessity was
present.
For the greater good of society and social justice, the
Legislature thus enacted both our Workmen's Compensation
Law, and the no-fault insurance statute sub judice.4
The dissent recognized that FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.738 (1972) did
not abolish the right of tort action, but rather placed reasonable limita-
tions upon it which were offset by the speed, efficiency, and certainy of
no-fault insurance.
The KIuger decision presents new, constitutional constructions
which are contrapositive to those of the landmark Massachusetts case
of Pinnick v. Cleary; and though in Pinnick personal injury liability
was at issue and not the property damage section, the constitutional
issues were the same. Both cases involved virtually identical no-fault
statutes.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the right to sue in
tort for personal injuries, and pain and suffering was not a funda-
mental right and therefore not guaranteed by the state constitution.
Thus a court would find a strong presumption of constitutionality.
In addition the court, citing overcrowded courts, the high cost of auto
insurance, inefficiency of the negligence system, and inequity in the re-
coveries of injured plaintiffs, found sufficient factual justification for
the statute.5
Article 11 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution guarantees a remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries,
and is similar to the above mentioned Florida provision. But in con-
4. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
S. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 602 (Mass. 1971), noted in 40 U. CiN. L.
REV. 849 (1971).
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struing this article, the Massachusetts court held that this was clearly
a protection of procedural rights only and asserted that:
. . .changes in prior law are necessary in any ordered so-
ciety, and to argue that art. 11 prohibits alterations of com-
mon law rights as such., flies in the face of all reason
and precedent.6
At least one other state has also limited such a constitutional provision
to procedural rights.7
The Kluger decision clearly raises a challenge to the sweeping
approval won by no-fault insurance in Massachusetts. In addition,
it will have great effect for future no-fault insurance programs as they
are tested or adopted in other states.
At the present time Oklahoma does not have a no-fault bill be-
fore the legislature,8 but should a plan be proposed again, the drafters
will have to face the constitutional challenge raised by Kluger. Okla-
homa, like Florida and Massachusetts, also has a constitutional provi-
sion requiring the courts to be open to every person.9 Prior case law
construing art. 2 § 6 indicates that Oklahoma would take a Massa-
chusetts approach and find a no-fault property damage statute of this
kind constitutional. As early as 1917, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld Workmen's Compensation as a legitimate exercise of the police
power,10 and held that art. 2 § 6 did not bar the legislature from abol-
ishing the rules which had theretofore determined liability in the mas-
ter-servant relationship. One cannot, however, predict whether the
court will find the same compelling social need and thus the analogy
to Workmen's Compensation cannot be conclusive. But if the court
could be convinced that there is a public necessity for no-fault to
justify modification of the right to sue in tort, then art. 2 § 6 would
6. 271 N.E.2d at 600.
7. Martel, No Fault Automobile Insurance In Pennsylvania-A Constitutional
Analysis, 17 VILL. L. Ray. 783 (1972).
The prevalent view today, however, is that such provisions are not intended
as restraints on the legislature, but rather are meant to preserve procedural
fairness for the injured person.
Id. at 793.
8. A bill was proposed in 1971, but was never enacted by the legislature. Okla.
H.B. 1270 33d Legis. 1st Sess. (1971).
9. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 6, provides, "'The courts of justice of the State shall
be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and
for every injury to person, property, or reputation ......
10. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 162 P. 938 (1917). The constitu-
tionality of the statute was reaffirmed in 1927, after it had been amended, Fox v.
Dunning, 124 Okla. 228, 255 P. 582 (1927); New Amsterdam Gas Co. v. Rinehart
& Donovan Co., 124 Okla. 227, 255 P. 587 (1927).
[Vol. 10
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not seem to be a bar to no-fault in Oklahoma. The property dam-
age section might be subject to challenges on other issues. As an ex-
ample, would mandatory coverage discriminate against the poor who
cannot afford the extra cost of property insurance, but whose car is
valued at less than $550.002
The drafters of a future no-fault bill could avoid the KIuger prob-
lem entirely by considering two alternative choices. The legislature
might first enact a mandatory property damage insurance section re-
quiring minimum coverage of $550.00. This plan allows a tort ac-
tion for property damage above $550.00. Secondly, the legislature
could give the auto owner the option of carrying either no-fault insur-
ance, with no tort claim for property damage or fault insurance under
which recovery for damages to his own car would be allowed if he
could prove a valid tort claim against another. This has been called
"Property Damage Dual Option Coverage."'"
In conclusion, Kluger will no doubt have great impact on pres-
ent and future no-fault insurance legislation. Hereafter, property
damage as well as personal injury sections will be subjected to close
judicial scrutiny. A property damage provision must be either an ade-
quate alternative to the tort action which it replaces, or there must be
an overpowering public necessity. Finally, the statute must be rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory. There is some indication that Okla-
homa might follow the more liberal view of Massachusetts and find that
no-fault insurance does provide an adequate alternative. However it is
important to remember that future drafters can avoid these constitu-
tional pitfalls completely by adopting legislation which includes either
a mandatory property damage insurance section or dual option cov-
erage.
Larry E. Evans
11. Keeton & O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward Nonfault Automobile Insurance,
71 COLum. L. REv. 241, 260 (1971).
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